COURT OF COURT 4th Criminal Chamber
BASIS: 2012/16551
DECISION: 2014/2237
The decision given by the Local Court was appealed, and the file was discussed according to the duration of the application, the nature of the decision and the date of the crime:
Since there were no reasons for the rejection of the appeal, we moved on to the merits of the matter.
In the examination made according to the minutes, documents and justification content reflecting the hearing process in which the conscientious opinion was formed, no other reasons were found to be appropriate.
However;
The value protected by the punishment of insulting acts is the rights of people to their honor, dignity and dignity, and in order for this crime to occur, the act must be committed in a way that offends the specified personal rights of a real person. The crime of insult constitutes the limits of freedom of expression regulated in Articles 24 to 30 of the Constitution and Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In terms of the act that constitutes the crime, the freedom of expression of the perpetrator, and the basic personal rights of freedom of religion, conscience and opinion conflict with the honor, dignity and dignity of the victim. Resolution of the dispute requires balancing the mutual rights in question. However, it is clear that acts of blasphemy, which have no connection with an idea put forward and cannot actually be considered as an expression of thought, cannot benefit from freedom of expression. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), while interpreting supranational human rights law in the context of the Convention in its jurisprudence, states that public officials must be protected against derogatory attacks aimed at affecting their functions and damaging their reputation while performing their duties (ECHR Busuioç v. Moldova decision, 2004, para. 64), however, they must show more tolerance towards criticism of their actions and words while performing their duties (see ECHR Steur v. Netherlands decision, 2003, paragraph 39) states. The European Court of Human Rights also accepts that statements consisting of value judgments that are not based on an accusation of action and do not require proof can be evaluated within the scope of the right to criticism and freedom of expression, even if they are shocking (see; ECHMHRiko v. Slovakia decision, 2004, paragraphs 40, 45; Jeruselam v. Austria decision, 2001, paragraph 44; Sokolowski v. Poland decision, 2005, paragraph 47; Paturel-France decision, 2005, para. 37; Harris/Boyle/Bates/Buckley, European Convention on Human Rights Law, Ankara 2013, p. 518-520).
In the file examined, in the case where it is accepted that the defendant insulted the public officials because of their duties with the words “I am well aware of the extortionist mentality of executioners who do not understand the Constitution, Laws, Regulations, judiciary and rights and who do not understand the Constitution, Laws, Regulations, judiciary and rights, I will submit the issue to the Turkish authorities in line with my duty to serve my country, my family, the disabled and my beliefs” in the petition he wrote about the board members who did not give permission to investigate the officers who unfairly did not give him a license to establish a fish farm. Establishing a sentence of conviction on insufficient grounds, without considering that the sentences remaining in the dimension of criticism and complaint due to the belief that he was treated unfairly do not constitute the elements of the crime of insult, on the grounds explained above,
Since it was deemed unlawful and the defendant E…’s reasons for appeal were deemed appropriate, it was unanimously decided on 28/01/2014 to REVERSE THE JUDGMENT by rejecting the idea of approval in the notification, and to continue the trial starting from the pre-reversal stage and send the file to the main/trial court for finalization.